ВИФ2 NE: Ветка : Оба-на! США нарушают запрет бактериологического оружия!!!

От	А.Никольский
К	All
Дата	04.09.2001 19:24:56
Рубрики	Современность; Спецслужбы; Армия; Локальные конфликты; Политек; ...

Оба-на! США нарушают запрет бактериологического оружия!!!

От	Олег...
К	А.Никольский (04.09.2001 19:24:56)
Дата	05.09.2001 09:41:30

Пора бомбить? Вводить войска ООН? По Иракскому сценарию??? (-)

От	Пехота
К	А.Никольский (04.09.2001 19:24:56)
Дата	05.09.2001 08:53:30

Вроде как представитель Белого Дома (американского) подтвердил (-)

От	Сергей С
К	А.Никольский (04.09.2001 19:24:56)
Дата	04.09.2001 21:42:30

А действительно, волна?

Ниже по конфе кто-то уважаемый постил рассказ о только что прошедшей программе "60 минут" на ТВ США о разработках бактериологического оружия в России. И там как раз содержание с точность до -наоборот. Вот и думай, кто кого...

С уважением
Сергей С.

От	А.Никольский
К	Сергей С (04.09.2001 21:42:30)
Дата	04.09.2001 21:57:22

Похоже, этой передачей США себя прикрывали (-)

От	Сергей С
К	А.Никольский (04.09.2001 21:57:22)
Дата	05.09.2001 00:22:36

Или мы себя статьей?...8))) (не бейте, шутка) (0)

От	А.Никольский
К	Сергей С (05.09.2001 00:22:36)
Дата	05.09.2001 14:16:28

Нам бы денег не хватило заказать в такой газете статью (-)

От	Саня
К	А.Никольский (05.09.2001 14:16:28)
Дата	05.09.2001 14:20:01

Re: Нам бы...

Да нет, теперь всё ясно - это просто очередная и довольно неуклюжая попытка оправдаться в общем IMO непонятно за что. Какая-то действительно совсем пиаровская акция, а не новость. Запрет ведь действительно был на ферментёрное производство боевых штаммов, на производство и складирование боеприпасов. Всё остальное имеет крайне зыбкие границы.
С уважением
С

От	Venik
К	А.Никольский (04.09.2001 19:24:56)
Дата	04.09.2001 20:24:10

Оригинал

Весьма обширная статья, должен заметить. После данной статьи я привел другие статьи на эту тему напечатанные в NY Times. Кстати, там тоже упоминают Неваду. Тот-же автор.

И все-же загляните на сайт газеты - там есть карты и фото.

Venik

U.S. Germ Warfare Research Pushes Treaty Limits
By THE NEW YORK TIMES
September 4, 2001

This article was reported and written by Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg and William J. Broad.

Оver the past several years, the United States has embarked on a program of secret research on biological weapons that, some officials say, tests the limits of the global treaty banning such weapons.

The 1972 treaty forbids nations from developing or acquiring weapons that spread disease, but it allows work on vaccines and other protective measures. Government officials said the secret research, which mimicked the major steps a state or terrorist would take to create a biological arsenal, was aimed at better understanding the threat.

The projects, which have not been previously disclosed, were begun under President Clinton and have been embraced by the Bush administration, which intends to expand them.

Earlier this year, administration officials said, the Pentagon drew up plans to engineer genetically a potentially more potent variant of the bacterium that causes anthrax, a deadly disease ideal for germ warfare.

The experiment has been devised to assess whether the vaccine now being given to millions of American soldiers is effective against such a superbug, which was first created by Russian scientists. A Bush administration official said the National Security Council is expected to give the final go-ahead later this month.

Two other projects completed during the Clinton administration focused on the mechanics of making germ weapons.

In a program code-named Clear Vision, the Central Intelligence Agency built and tested a model of a Soviet-designed germ bomb that agency officials feared was being sold on the international market. The C.I.A. device lacked a fuse and other parts that would make it a working bomb, intelligence officials said.

At about the same time, Pentagon experts assembled a germ factory in the Nevada desert from commercially available materials. Pentagon officials said the project demonstrated the ease with which a terrorist or rogue nation could build a plant that could produce pounds of the deadly germs.

Both the mock bomb and the factory were tested with simulants — benign substances with characteristics similar to the germs used in weapons, officials said.

A senior Bush administration official said all the projects were "fully consistent" with the treaty banning biological weapons and were needed to protect Americans against a growing danger. "This administration will pursue defenses against the full spectrum of biological threats," the official said.

The treaty, another administration official said, allows the United States to conduct research on both microbes and germ munitions for "protective or defensive purposes."

Some Clinton administration officials worried, however, that the project violated the pact. And others expressed concern that the experiments, if disclosed, might be misunderstood as a clandestine effort to resume work on a class of weapons that President Nixon had relinquished in 1969.

Simultaneous experiments involving a model of a germ bomb, a factory to make biological agents and the developoment of more potent anthrax, these officials said, would draw vociferous protests from Washington if conducted by a country the United States viewed as suspect.

Administration officials said the need to keep such projects secret was a significant reason behind President Bush's recent rejection of a draft agreement to strengthen the germ-weapons treaty, which has been signed by 143 nations.

The draft would require those countries to disclose where they are conducting defensive research involving gene-splicing or germs likely to be used in weapons. The sites would then be subject to international inspections.

Many national security officials in both the Clinton and Bush administrations opposed the draft, arguing that it would give potential adversaries a road map to what the United States considers its most serious vulnerabilities.

Among the facilities likely to be open to inspection under the draft agreement would be the West Jefferson, Ohio, laboratory of the Battelle Memorial Institute, a military contractor that has been selected to create the genetically altered anthrax.

Several officials who served in senior posts in the Clinton administration acknowledged that the secretive efforts were so poorly coordinated that even the White House was unaware of their full scope.

The Pentagon's project to build a germ factory was not reported to the White House, they said. President Clinton, who developed an intense interest in germ weapons, was never briefed on the programs under way or contemplated, the officials said.

A former senior official in the Clinton White House conceded that in retrospect, someone should have been responsible for reviewing the projects to ensure that they were not only effective in defending the United States, but consistent with the nation's arms-control pledges.

The C.I.A.'s tests on the bomb model touched off a dispute among government experts after the tests were concluded in 2000, with some officials arguing that they violated the germ treaty's prohibition against developing weapons.

Intelligence officials said lawyers at the agency and the White House concluded that the work was defensive, and therefore allowed. But even officials who supported the effort acknowledged that it brought the United States closer to what was forbidden.

"It was pressing how far you go before you do something illegal or immoral," recalled one senior official who was briefed on the program.

Public disclosure of the research is likely to complicate the position of the United States, which has long been in the forefront of efforts to enforce the ban on germ weapons.

The Bush administration's willingness to abandon the 1972 Antiballistic Missile treaty has already drawn criticism around the world. And the administration's stance on the draft agreement for the germ treaty has put Washington at odds with many of its allies, including Japan and Britain.

The Original Treaty

During the cold war, both the United States and the Soviet Union produced vast quantities of germ weapons, enough to kill everyone on earth.

Eager to halt the spread of what many called the poor man's atom bomb, the United States unilaterally gave up germ arms and helped lead the global campaign to abolish them. By 1975, most of the world's nations had signed the convention.

In doing so, they agreed not to develop, produce, acquire or stockpile quantities or types of germs that had no "prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes." They also pledged not to develop or obtain weapons or other equipment "designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict."

There were at least two significant loopholes: The pact did not define "defensive" research or say what studies might be prohibited, if any. And it provided no means of catching cheaters.

In the following decades, several countries did cheat, some on a huge scale. The Soviet Union built entire cities devoted to developing germ weapons, employing tens of thousands of people and turning anthrax, smallpox and bubonic plague into weapons of war. In the late 1980's, Iraq began a crash program to produce its own germ arsenal.

Both countries insisted that their programs were for defensive purposes.

American intelligence officials had suspected that Baghdad and Moscow were clandestinely producing germ weapons. But the full picture of their efforts did not become clear until the 1990's, after several Iraqi and Soviet officials defected.

Fears about the spread of biological weapons were deepened by the rise of terrorism against Americans, the great strides in genetic engineering and the collapse of the Soviet Union, which left thousands of scientists skilled in biological warfare unemployed, penniless and vulnerable to recruitment.

The threat disclosed a quandary: While the United States spent billions of dollars a year to assess enemy military forces and to defend against bullets, tanks, bombs and jet fighters, it knew relatively little about the working of exotic arms it had relinquished long ago.

Designing a Delivery System

In the mid-1990's, the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies stepped up their search for information about other nations' biological research programs, focusing on the former Soviet Union, Iran, Iraq and Libya, among others. Much of the initial emphasis was on the germs that enemies might use in an attack, officials said.

But in 1997, the agency embarked on Clear Vision, which focused on weapons systems that would deliver the germs.

Intelligence officials said the project was led by Gene Johnson, a senior C.I.A. scientist who had long worked with some of the world's deadliest viruses. Dr. Johnson was eager to understand the damage that Soviet miniature bombs — bomblets, in military parlance — might inflict.

The agency asked its spies to find or buy a Soviet bomblet, which releases germs in a fine mist. That search proved unsuccessful, and the agency approved a proposal to build a replica and study how well it could disperse its lethal cargo.

The agency's lawyers concluded that such a project was permitted by the treaty because the intent was defensive. Intelligence officials said the C.I.A. had reports that at least one nation was trying to buy the Soviet- made bomblets.

A model was constructed and the agency conducted two sets of tests at Battelle, the military contractor. The experiments measured dissemination characteristics and how the model performed under different atmospheric conditions, intelligence officials said. They emphasized that the device was a "portion" of a bomb that could not have been used as a weapon.

The experiments caused concern at the White House, which learned about the project after it was under way. Some aides to President Clinton worried that the benefits did not justify the risks. But a White House lawyer led a joint assessment by several departments that concluded that the program did not violate the treaty, and it went ahead.

The questions were debated anew after the project was completed, this time without consensus. A State Department official argued for a strict reading of the treaty: the ban on acquiring or developing "weapons" barred states from building even a partial model of a germ bomb, no matter what the rationale.

"A bomb is a bomb is a bomb," another official said at the time.

The C.I.A. continued to insist that it had the legal authority to conduct such tests and, intelligence officials said, the agency was prepared to reopen the fight over how to interpret the treaty. But even so, the agency ended the Clear Vision project in the last year of the Clinton administration, intelligence officials said.

Bill Harlow, the C.I.A. spokesman, acknowledged that the agency had conducted "laboratory or experimental" work to assess the intelligence it had gathered about biological warfare.

"Everything we have done in this respect was entirely appropriate, necessary, consistent with U.S. treaty obligations and was briefed to the National Security Council staff and appropriate Congressional oversight committees," Mr. Harlow said.

Breeding More Potent Anthrax

In the 1990's, government officials also grew increasingly worried about the possibility that scientists could use the widely available techniques of gene-splicing to create even more deadly weapons.

Those concerns deepened in 1995, when Russian scientists disclosed at a scientific conference in Britain that they had implanted genes from Bacillus cereus, an organism that causes food poisoning, into the anthrax microbe.

The scientists said later that the experiments were peaceful; the two microbes can be found side-by-side in nature and, the Russians said, they wanted to see what happened if they cross-bred.

A published account of the experiment, which appeared in a scientific journal in late 1997, alarmed the Pentagon, which had just decided to require that American soldiers be vaccinated against anthrax. According to the article, the new strain was resistant to Russia's anthrax vaccine, at least in hamsters.

American officials tried to obtain a sample from Russia through a scientific exchange program to see whether the Russians had really created such a hybrid. The Americans also wanted to test whether the microbe could defeat the American vaccine, which is different from that used by Russia.

Despite repeated promises, the bacteria were never provided.

Eventually the C.I.A. drew up plans to replicate the strain, but intelligence officials said the agency hesitated because there was no specific report that an adversary was attempting to turn the superbug into a weapon.

This year, officials said, the project was taken over by the Pentagon's intelligence arm, the Defense Intelligence Agency. Pentagon lawyers reviewed the proposal and said it complied with the treaty. Officials said the research would be part of Project Jefferson, yet another government effort to track the dangers posed by germ weapons.

A spokesman for Defense Intelligence, Lt. Cmdr. James Brooks, declined comment. Asked about the precautions at Battelle, which is to create the enhanced anthrax, Commander Brooks said security was "entirely suitable for all work already conducted and planned for Project Jefferson."

The Question of Secrecy

While several officials in both the Clinton and Bush administrations called this and other research long overdue, they expressed concern about the lack of a central system for vetting such proposals.

And a former American diplomat questioned the wisdom of keeping them secret.

James F. Leonard, head of the delegation that negotiated the germ treaty, said research on microbes or munitions could be justified, depending on the specifics.

But he said such experiments should be done openly, exposed to the scrutiny of scientists and the public. Public disclosure, he said, is important evidence that the United States is proceeding with a "clean heart."

"It's very important to be open," he said. "If we're not open, who's going to be open?"

Mr. Leonard said the fine distinctions drawn by government lawyers were frequently ignored when a secret program was exposed. Then, he said, others offer the harshest possible interpretations — a "vulgarization of what has been done."

But he concluded that the secret germ research, as described to him, was "foolish, but not illegal."
--------------------------------

Next to Old Rec Hall, a 'Germ-Making Plant'
By JUDITH MILLER

September 4, 2001

CAMP 12, NEVADA TEST SITE, Nevada — In a nondescript mustard-colored building that was once a military recreation hall and barbershop, the Pentagon has built a germ factory that could make enough lethal microbes to wipe out entire cities.

Adjacent to the pool tables, the shuffleboard and the bar stands a gleaming stainless steel cylinder, the 50-liter (53- quart) fermenter in which germs can be cultivated.

The apparatus, which includes a latticework of pipes and other equipment, was made entirely with commercially available components bought from hardware stores and other suppliers for about $1 million — a pittance for a weapon that could deliver death on such a large scale.

The factory was built by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, an arm of the Pentagon that works to contain the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Officials said the project was intended to assess how hard it would be for a terrorist or rogue nation to assemble a germ factory.

The agency also wanted to see if a small operation produced any telltale "signatures" — sounds, chemical emissions or patterns of operation that could help intelligence agencies find such plants.

"The project also showed us how relatively simple it would be for a terrorist to assemble such a facility without being detected," said Jay C. Davis, the former director of the agency who, with the Pentagon's permission, showed the secret plant to a Times reporter and a team from ABC News.

Officials stressed that the plant never made anthrax or any other lethal pathogen. Rather, it produced only harmless biopesticides during two production test runs in 1999 and 2000. Dr. Davis declined to say how much was made. But if it had been anthrax germs, he said, it would have made enough to kill at least 10,000 people.

Officials said the Pentagon built the plant in this largely deserted camp because it was well guarded. Building 12-7, the former recreation hall and about four dozen other buildings here were abruptly closed in January 1993 after the global moratorium on underground nuclear testing took effect.

Between 1951 and 1963, more than 800 nuclear tests were conducted here at the vast Nevada Test Site, whose parched sands and eerily quiet, sagebrush-covered mesas and mountains are scarred by giant atomic craters.

The interior of Building 12-7 — 120 feet long and 40 feet wide — seems frozen in time. Dusty signs warn visitors not to sit on the pool tables or to talk about secret projects with anyone who has no "need to know."

Dr. Davis and other officials said the Defense Department's lawyers had carefully reviewed the project to ensure that it did not violate the biological weapons treaty or American law. Because it was purely defensive and never made deadly germs, it was both legal and appropriate, he and others said.

But apparently few outside of the agency or even in the Pentagon's upper echelons knew much about the secret project. Dr. Davis said the White House was never briefed about it, given its small scale and low cost.

When subsequently told about the germ factory, several former White House officials said they were stunned that the agency's lawyers had approved it without having referred it to the White House or Congressional oversight committees for legal review.

The Pentagon's decision to permit a visit to the site came after The Times requested information about the program, called Bachus.

Some officials said the project, with its fermentation aspect, was named for Bacchus, the Greek god of wine. But an agency spokesman said the name was an acronym for Biotechnology Activity Characterization by Unconventional Signatures.
---------------------------

U.S. Explores Other Options on Preventing Germ Warfare
By JUDITH MILLER

July 25, 2001

Senior administration official said yesterday that although the White House rejects a draft agreement under discussion at talks in Geneva, it remains committed to strengthening a 1972 treaty banning biological weapons and has already begun exploring alternative ways of enforcing the ban and deterring and punishing cheaters.

Though hesitant to discuss in detail the alternatives that would soon be shared with American allies, the official said in an interview that the administration might seek to strengthen export controls on the sale of sophisticated, germ-production equipment and technology.

The United States might also pursue "international legal instruments" that would prevent terrorist groups or countries from getting and misusing dangerous germs and toxins.

He and other officials said the administration had decided that it was not feasible to verify whether states were abiding by the germ weapons ban given the rapid advances in biotechnology and the ability of cheaters to hide illicit activities.

"You can't apply traditional arms control thinking to biotechnology," one official said. "You need out-of- the-box solutions to stopping the spread of this kind of weapon because it is unlike any other."

He and other officials described the alternative approaches as the United States prepared to explain the administration's rejection of the draft agreement to enforce the germ weapons ban that is being weighed in Geneva. On Wednesday, Donald H. Mahley, the American representative to the protracted negotiations, is expected to announce America's opposition to the proposed monitoring accord, known as a protocol.

After an extensive review this spring, the Bush administration concluded that the proposed protocol was conceptually flawed beyond repair and that the United States would not be backed into a diplomatic corner by being forced to choose between approving the current version of the protocol or having no enforcement mechanism at all.

"The protocol does not stop the threat posed by the spread of biological weapons, or deter cheaters, or enhance verification," the official said. But the protocol's requirement that states declare facilities in which weapons could be made and permit them to be inspected "does put our bio-defense activities and proprietary commercial interests at risk."

This verdict has put the United States at odds once more with European nations and other powers, which have urged international support for the protocol. Though flawed, a spokesman for the European Union said on Monday, the protocol reflected compromises that most of the treaty's 143 members could accept and hence was the best way of strengthening the treaty.

The officials who spoke yesterday seemed eager to combat the contentions that the Bush administration is both hostile to arms control and is intent on pursuing a unilateralist foreign policy. Neither is true, they asserted.

"The administration remains firmly committed to the treaty and to stopping the spread of biological weapons, but through effective and innovative measures," the senior official said. "This protocol falls short of meeting these objectives."

The official echoed the Clinton administration's assertion that the treaty is already being violated by Iran and others who have signed it. "Iran has an offensive biological weapons program," the official said, contending that its enthusiasm for the draft protocol demonstrated the accord's inherent weakness.

"Iran would not be signing a document that prevents it from cheating," the official said.

Rather than try to draft a protocol that satisfies "cheaters," administration officials say, they want to work with the "99 percent" of countries that respect the ban to strengthen ways to stop the misuse of this rapidly developing technology and to share information about ongoing research.

Toward that end, the official said, the administration would support efforts to expand the surveillance and control of sensitive technology through, for example, the Australia Group. Begun in the mid-1980's as part of an effort to stop the spread of technology used in weapons of mass destruction, the approximately 30 members of this informal group screen and coordinate controls on the sale of such technology.

Officials said they would also endorse efforts by individual states to pass legislation and international treaties or conventions that make it a crime to buy, build, acquire or use a biological weapon for terrorist attacks.

Administration officials complained that they had had virtually no chance to affect the protocol that was drafted by the chairman of the negotiating group in Geneva. The draft was circulating less than six weeks after President Bush took office, the official said.
-----------------------------------

От	Саня
К	Venik (04.09.2001 20:24:10)
Дата	05.09.2001 11:28:17

O, спасибо сейчас стало более понятно

>U.S. Germ Warfare Research Pushes Treaty Limits
>By THE NEW YORK TIMES
>September 4, 2001

>This article was reported and written by Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg and William J. Broad.

>The 1972 treaty forbids nations from developing or acquiring weapons that spread disease, but it allows work on vaccines and other protective measures. Government officials said the secret research, which mimicked the major steps a state or terrorist would take to create a biological arsenal, was aimed at better understanding the threat.

Дык это давно известная вещь. Газета вру как раз КЛЮЧЕВОЙ момент и упустила. Про эти mockups всем давно известно.... А я-то думал...

>The projects, which have not been previously disclosed, were begun under President Clinton and have been embraced by the Bush administration, which intends to expand them.
Earlier this year, administration officials said, the Pentagon drew up plans to engineer genetically a potentially more potent variant of the bacterium that causes anthrax, a deadly disease ideal for germ warfare.

Вот это флаг им в руки и танк навстречу. Во-первых это не нужно, во-вторых настолько опасно, что амеры вряд ли свяжутся. Им дом в Форт-Детрике ещё долго икаться будет.

>The experiment has been devised to assess whether the vaccine now being given to millions of American soldiers is effective against such a superbug, which was first created by Russian scientists. A Bush administration official said the National Security Council is expected to give the final go-ahead later this month.

Никогда в России не было генноинженерных боевых штаммов СЯ. И тут очень хитрые манипуляции с контекстом. На самом деле СНАЧАЛА говорится, что амеры-де будут инженерить штамм (что скорее всего фигня), а потом говориться, что русские создали супер-СЯ. Из контекста должно как бы исходить, что наши штаммы-генноинженерные, хотя прямо об этом не сказано. Манипуляторы хреновы. Но...где тонко, там и рвётся.

>Two other projects completed during the Clinton administration focused on the mechanics of making germ weapons.In a program code-named Clear Vision, the Central Intelligence Agency built and tested a model of a Soviet-designed germ bomb that agency officials feared was being sold on the international market. The C.I.A. device lacked a fuse and other parts that would make it a working bomb, intelligence officials said. At about the same time, Pentagon experts assembled a germ factory in the Nevada desert from commercially available materials. Pentagon officials said the project demonstrated the ease with which a terrorist or rogue nation could build a plant that could produce pounds of the deadly germs.

А, дык это модель (неработающая) для демонстрации того, что СЯ можно делать практически на коленке. Но это людям не очень далёким от темы ясно уже тридцать лет. И это НЕ промышленный объект. Это просто пугало. Поскольку такую фабрику можно построить за неделю при наличии соответсвующего здания.

>Both the mock bomb and the factory were tested with simulants — benign substances with characteristics similar to the germs used in weapons, officials said.

Ну да, вырастили безплазмидные штаммы СЯ или вакцинные штаммы чумы, показали и успокоились :)

>A senior Bush administration official said all the projects were "fully consistent" with the treaty banning biological weapons and were needed to protect Americans against a growing danger. "This administration will pursue defenses against the full spectrum of biological threats," the official said.The treaty, another administration official said, allows the United States to conduct research on both microbes and germ munitions for "protective or defensive purposes."

Опять же давно известная вещь.

>Some Clinton administration officials worried, however, that the project violated the pact. And others expressed concern that the experiments, if disclosed, might be misunderstood as a clandestine effort to resume work on a class of weapons that President Nixon had relinquished in 1969.
Simultaneous experiments involving a model of a germ bomb, a factory to make biological agents and the developoment of more potent anthrax, these officials said, would draw vociferous protests from Washington if conducted by a country the United States viewed as suspect.

Никто в этом не сомневается :). Но к реальному бакоружию это не имеет отношения.

>Administration officials said the need to keep such projects secret was a significant reason behind President Bush's recent rejection of a draft agreement to strengthen the germ-weapons treaty, which has been signed by 143 nations.The draft would require those countries to disclose where they are conducting defensive research involving gene-splicing or germs likely to be used in weapons. The sites would then be subject to international inspections.Many national security officials in both the Clinton and Bush administrations opposed the draft, arguing that it would give potential adversaries a road map to what the United States considers its most serious vulnerabilities.

Гы, а вот это фигня. Штаты достаточно печатают открытых статей, чобы понять, чем они там занимаются. Специалисту понять. И чего они больше всего опасаются тоже как бы не секрет - все того же опасаются.

>A model was constructed and the agency conducted two sets of tests at Battelle, the military contractor. The experiments measured dissemination characteristics and how the model performed under different atmospheric conditions, intelligence officials said. They emphasized that the device was a "portion" of a bomb that could not have been used as a weapon.

>The experiments caused concern at the White House, which learned about the project after it was under way. Some aides to President Clinton worried that the benefits did not justify the risks. But a White House lawyer led a joint assessment by several departments that concluded that the program did not violate the treaty, and it went ahead.

>The questions were debated anew after the project was completed, this time without consensus. A State Department official argued for a strict reading of the treaty: the ban on acquiring or developing "weapons" barred states from building even a partial model of a germ bomb, no matter what the rationale.

>"A bomb is a bomb is a bomb," another official said at the time.

>The C.I.A. continued to insist that it had the legal authority to conduct such tests and, intelligence officials said, the agency was prepared to reopen the fight over how to interpret the treaty. But even so, the agency ended the Clear Vision project in the last year of the Clinton administration, intelligence officials said.

>Bill Harlow, the C.I.A. spokesman, acknowledged that the agency had conducted "laboratory or experimental" work to assess the intelligence it had gathered about biological warfare.

>"Everything we have done in this respect was entirely appropriate, necessary, consistent with U.S. treaty obligations and was briefed to the National Security Council staff and appropriate Congressional oversight committees," Mr. Harlow said.

Ничего ужасного я в этом не вижу. Какие бы там Штаты ни были, это их право брать оружие потенциального противника и изучать его. Как и наше право ;)

>Breeding More Potent Anthrax

>In the 1990's, government officials also grew increasingly worried about the possibility that scientists could use the widely available techniques of gene-splicing to create even more deadly weapons.Those concerns deepened in 1995, when Russian scientists disclosed at a scientific conference in Britain that they had implanted genes from Bacillus cereus, an organism that causes food poisoning, into the anthrax microbe.

>The scientists said later that the experiments were peaceful; the two microbes can be found side-by-side in nature and, the Russians said, they wanted to see what happened if they cross-bred.

>A published account of the experiment, which appeared in a scientific journal in late 1997, alarmed the Pentagon, which had just decided to require that American soldiers be vaccinated against anthrax. According to the article, the new strain was resistant to Russia's anthrax vaccine, at least in hamsters.

А ВОТ ГРЯЗИ НЕ НАДО. Всё с точность до наоборот. И вот ссылка.

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9413092&dopt=Abstract

>American officials tried to obtain a sample from Russia through a scientific exchange program to see whether the Russians had really created such a hybrid. The Americans also wanted to test whether the microbe could defeat the American vaccine, which is different from that used by Russia.

>Despite repeated promises, the bacteria were never provided.

А потому что давать было совершенно нечего. Прочтите абстракт и поймёте. Сильно передёргивают, сволочи.

>Eventually the C.I.A. drew up plans to replicate the strain, but intelligence officials said the agency hesitated because there was no specific report that an adversary was attempting to turn the superbug into a weapon.

>This year, officials said, the project was taken over by the Pentagon's intelligence arm, the Defense Intelligence Agency. Pentagon lawyers reviewed the proposal and said it complied with the treaty. Officials said the research would be part of Project Jefferson, yet another government effort to track the dangers posed by germ weapons.

>A spokesman for Defense Intelligence, Lt. Cmdr. James Brooks, declined comment. Asked about the precautions at Battelle, which is to create the enhanced anthrax, Commander Brooks said security was "entirely suitable for all work already conducted and planned for Project Jefferson."

Флаг в руки, я уже повторяюсь :)

>Next to Old Rec Hall, a 'Germ-Making Plant'
>By JUDITH MILLER

>September 4, 2001

>CAMP 12, NEVADA TEST SITE, Nevada — In a nondescript mustard-colored building that was once a military recreation hall and barbershop, the Pentagon has built a germ factory that could make enough lethal microbes to wipe out entire cities.

>Adjacent to the pool tables, the shuffleboard and the bar stands a gleaming stainless steel cylinder, the 50-liter (53- quart) fermenter in which germs can be cultivated.

>The apparatus, which includes a latticework of pipes and other equipment, was made entirely with commercially available components bought from hardware stores and other suppliers for about $1 million — a pittance for a weapon that could deliver death on such a large scale.

>The factory was built by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, an arm of the Pentagon that works to contain the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Officials said the project was intended to assess how hard it would be for a terrorist or rogue nation to assemble a germ factory.

>The agency also wanted to see if a small operation produced any telltale "signatures" — sounds, chemical emissions or patterns of operation that could help intelligence agencies find such plants.

>"The project also showed us how relatively simple it would be for a terrorist to assemble such a facility without being detected," said Jay C. Davis, the former director of the agency who, with the Pentagon's permission, showed the secret plant to a Times reporter and a team from ABC News.

>Officials stressed that the plant never made anthrax or any other lethal pathogen. Rather, it produced only harmless biopesticides during two production test runs in 1999 and 2000. Dr. Davis declined to say how much was made. But if it had been anthrax germs, he said, it would have made enough to kill at least 10,000 people.

>Officials said the Pentagon built the plant in this largely deserted camp because it was well guarded. Building 12-7, the former recreation hall and about four dozen other buildings here were abruptly closed in January 1993 after the global moratorium on underground nuclear testing took effect.

>Between 1951 and 1963, more than 800 nuclear tests were conducted here at the vast Nevada Test Site, whose parched sands and eerily quiet, sagebrush-covered mesas and mountains are scarred by giant atomic craters.

>The interior of Building 12-7 — 120 feet long and 40 feet wide — seems frozen in time. Dusty signs warn visitors not to sit on the pool tables or to talk about secret projects with anyone who has no "need to know."

>Dr. Davis and other officials said the Defense Department's lawyers had carefully reviewed the project to ensure that it did not violate the biological weapons treaty or American law. Because it was purely defensive and never made deadly germs, it was both legal and appropriate, he and others said.

>But apparently few outside of the agency or even in the Pentagon's upper echelons knew much about the secret project. Dr. Davis said the White House was never briefed about it, given its small scale and low cost.

>When subsequently told about the germ factory, several former White House officials said they were stunned that the agency's lawyers had approved it without having referred it to the White House or Congressional oversight committees for legal review.

>The Pentagon's decision to permit a visit to the site came after The Times requested information about the program, called Bachus.

Ну какой же это завод? Смех один.

В общем, крайне причудливая смесь лжи, правды и полуправды. Но ничего нового или особенно опасного. Обычные выкрики.

С уважением
С

От	Саня
К	А.Никольский (04.09.2001 19:24:56)
Дата	04.09.2001 19:49:04

Re: Очень странно.

Я как-то далёк от мысли обелять Штаты, но звучит это всё странно. Надо бы всё-таки оригинал раздобыть. Штаты несомненно интересуются сибирской язвой и ведут вполне открытые и вполне научные работы по этому поводу. Мы, кстати, тоже. И чумы то же самое касается - для Штатов чума крайне актуальна - у них случаи практически каждый год -не то, что у нас или в Казахстане - типа пару чижиков заболело за пять лет и уже всех на уши поставили.

>С ведома Клинтона в рамках программы Clear Vision специалисты из ЦРУ воссоздали и испытали модель советской бактериологической бомбы, которая, как они опасались, скоро могла появиться на черном рынке оружия.

Это какая-то чушь. Даже не знаю что сказать. какая к чёрту модель -сибирская язва не от модели бомбы зависит, а от модели штамма :)

>Примерно в то же время в пустыне Невады была собрана целая фабрика по производству бактериологического оружия. Все материалы для нее были куплены на совершенно законных основаниях, и эксперты ЦРУ объяснили, что этот эксперимент был им нужен для того, чтобы продемонстрировать, с какой легкостью террористы так называемых стран-изгоев могут заняться производством бактериологического оружия.

Кгм. Вот это СОВСЕМ странно. То есть не могу сейчас сказать, что на 100% лажа, но что-то не верится. Скорее всего действительно в Неваде могли что-то построить. Какое-нито новое facility для работы с особо опасными. Это запросто - они есть и у них и у нас. Но вот фабрику по производству боевых штаммов - это очень вряд ли.

>Официальные лица заявили, что и модель бомбы, и фабрика испытывались без использования потенциально опасных веществ. Между тем, как признали несколько высокопоставленных служащих администрации Клинтона, эти разработки держались в таком секрете, что даже Белый дом не располагал полной информацией о них.

Конгресс всё равно ДОЛЖЕН быть информирован о деталях. Иначе это совсем против правил.

>Теперь Пентагон планирует разработать генетически измененный вариант сибирской язвы для того, чтобы проверить, насколько прививки, использующиеся в вооруженных силах США, защищают от этой смертельно опасной болезни.

Чушь! Какие прививки и какой такой генетически изменённый штамм? Где имение а где вода....

Короче скорее всего из дыма сделали много огня. Может это и правильно, но довольно опасно - может и впрямь подтолкнуть амеров возобновить разработки боевых штаммов. Буду копать.

С уважением
С

От	FVL1~01
К	Саня (04.09.2001 19:49:04)
Дата	05.09.2001 00:33:51

Кстати не знаю не знаю какая связь

И снова здравствуйте

Но сегодня Государственную Коллекцию Вирусов РАМН РФ проверяли, проверили документацию, рабочие журналы, расход ценных реактивов и сред. Посотрели фотки сделанные на новом микроскопе (я раздулся как индюк от гордости :-))). Всех похвалили и выпив и закусив уехали.

А заодно и подкинули некоторое (солидное) количество на дополнительные охранные системы (и мне на фотопленку и бумагу :-))). Ваще красота...

А вы говорите какая от таких сттей польза :-)))))

Прямая для русской науки!!!!

С уважением ФВЛ